Active-Directory

Introduction Some time ago I came across a CTF where no techniques worked for elevating foothold. Then someone mentioned “Timeroasting.” I went down the rabbit hole, found Tom Tervoort’s write-up explaining the attack, followed his steps—and cracked my way into a machine account with a weak password. That opened up lateral movement in the environment. Kerberos rejects tickets when client and server clocks differ by more than 5 minutes by default. A less commonly discussed aspect is that the exact mechanism keeping those clocks aligned quietly leaks crackable data for every computer account in the domain. No credentials needed. No standard security logs. No patch, because as Tervoort noted, this stems from protocol design rather than a traditional implementation flaw. ...

Introduction Active Directory environments are full of subtle misconfigurations that can lead to complete domain compromise. One of the less-documented attack paths combines two primitives that alone seem harmless: Constrained Delegation and WriteSPN. Together, they enable an attacker to impersonate any user, including Domain Admins, against a Domain Controller. SPN Jacking is particularly valuable when classic alternatives like RBCD or Shadow Credentials are blocked or monitored. SPN Jacking offers an alternative path to domain compromise using only WriteSPN and an already-configured delegation. ...